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Abstract: Since Viktor Papanek, at least, the ethics of designing has been organised 
according to moral imperatives: be authentic not phony, take notice of needs not 
wants . . . and so on. The social innovation that drives its creative urge from design 
practices appears not to have strayed far from Papanek’s path. To rid itself of such 
reactive ideologies, and so to create other conditions for the possibility of its 
creativity, design-driven social innovation might do well not merely to pitch itself as 
a morality articulated by, or in the thrall of, a transcendent authority, but maybe even 
to be occupied with different account of ethics altogether. This paper will seek to 
elucidate such a different ethics as an ethology along the lines Spinoza proposed 
and Deleuze championed. That is, it will therefore call for an affective designing that 
deals in the creation of modes of existence, from whose assemblages emerge other 
social and communal apparatuses. This paper is constructed of several sections – 
looking at assemblages (via Deleuze and Guattari and De Landa), affects (via 
Spinoza and Deleuze), modes of existence (via Souriau and Latour) – each of which 
is its own moment in this call with its own value and agenda, but with points of 
collision with the others. This paper will conclude by gesturing towards the type of 
social/collective that might emerge from this discussion. 
 







Affect, Assemblage and Modes of Existence. 
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‘The use of philosophy is to maintain an active novelty of fundamental ideas 
illuminating the social system.’ 
Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p. 174 
 
1. Opening remarks 
Recent times have seen the discourses around the social function, social 
responsibility and social responsiveness of design and innovation flourish.1 For 
social design and innovation theorists and practitioners Lorraine Gamman and 
Adam Thorpe (2011b), for example, the designation responsiveness is preferred to 
responsibility as it encompasses a more robust call to action in concert with the 
many stakeholders, shareholders and other actors involved in any act of social 
design and innovation. While their overall mission seems valid and even laudable, it 
is the concept of responsiveness that I would like to focus on at the outset of this 
piece, in order to provide the germ – or, rather, the irritant – from which this essay 
will emerge. With responsiveness, then, we have connotations of reaction, an action 
taken as an effect of something else happening, a response; active rather than 
passive, yes, but an act that places agency for itself somewhere else. Gilles Deleuze 
begins the chapter of Nietzsche et la philosophie (1962) that deals with Nietzsche’s 
concepts of active and reactive forces, by discussing Spinoza’s conception of the 
body. I will return to Spinoza, Deleuze and the body below, but the way in which 
Deleuze characterises active and reactive in these terms is helpful now; he writes: ‘In 
                                            
1 See, for example: Mulgan (2007); Murray (2009); and Howaldt and Schwartz (2010); and with a 





a body the superior or dominant forces are called active, and the inferior or 
dominated ones reactive. Active and reactive are precisely the original qualities that 
express the relationships between forces’ (Deleuze, 1962, p. 45; my translation). 
More than 20 years after writing this, and this time in relation to the work of his 
friend Michel Foucault, Deleuze (1986) will discuss the same kinds of imbalance 
between forces in terms of ‘power’, which is important now because I question 
socially responsive design’s relations to power. If the reactive stance is one that 
determines, and is determined by, one’s position of inferiority it leaves dubious a 
design that calls itself responsive while seeking to make positive social impact. 
While I may not necessarily deny the impetus that moves design-driven innovation 
away from activities of exploitation towards other less parasitical acts in the name of 
the social, I urge proponents of socially responsive design-driven innovation to 
articulate their activities in ways that do not demand, at worst, acceptance of, or at 
best reaction to, dominating discourses of power and the imbalance of forces that 
power requires.2 In what follows I will offer a way to think about design-driven 
innovation and the social that begins to reconstruct them in terms of active agents in 
affective relations; that is not to react but to set the conditions according to which 
social and design-driven innovation action can take place. It will be important in this 
reconstruction not only to provide another way of doing ethics – as an affective 
ethology, to use Spinoza’s and Deleuze’s preferred phrase – but also to highlight the 
ontological conditions and expressions that all of this demands. To do this I will 
                                            
2 Design and philosophy researcher Matt Kiem (2011) makes a similar point while critiquing from a 
social and political philosophy perspective a particular social design/social innovation project – 
Emerging User Demands (EMUDE) by well-respected practitioners and theorists in this field Ezio 
Manzini and Anna Meroni (2007) – finding that it ‘still remains allied to the structural conditions that 




engage with three things: first and foremost, with affect, as it is for rethinking ethics 
that Spinoza discusses affect. I do note that this would, ideally, also encounter 
politics – the preceding mention of power highlights this perfectly. I will defer such 
an investigation to another time, however, for brevity’s sake; but ask that the ways in 
which such connections might be made be not forgotten.3 Next, the concept of 
assemblage: for as Spinoza’s affective ethology generates complex networks of 
things working in impactful and intensive relations to each other, the emerging 
wholes as assemblages need theoretical location. Third, this piece will also examine 
the concept of modes of existence, as the things that affect, in assemblages, will 
exhibit ways of being that are neither homogenised by form, function or material 
(following Spinoza), nor unified under transcendent ideas. The lesson for design-
driven innovation in all this, is that an engagement with affective, assemblages of 
modes of existence will offer new ways of creating ethical ways of being, in 
differently constituted social groups, not simply responding to hegemonies of power 
and control as they are currently constructed. 
  I have positioned this paper so far in terms of a critique of socially 
responsive design seen as reactive. Before I move on, it is worth highlighting the 
wealth of work engaging with activist opportunities for and of design (e.g. Fuad-
Luke, 2009; Julier, 2013a and 2013b; Hroch, 2015) and in distinction to the reactive 
characteristic of socially responsive design innovation as discussed. Guy Julier 
notes, for example, the ways in which his concept of ‘design culture’ (2013c) 
                                            
3 The current essay has a companion piece which is still in progress, ‘Creating Modes of Existence. 
Towards an Ethological Design’ that focuses upon the work of Gilbert Simondon (1989, 2005, 2009), 
with some mention of Alfred North Whitehead, while examining the collision of ontology and ethics. A 
further piece on dispositif as a design political concept impacting the ontological and ethical ones 




spawns the pragmatics of ‘design activism’ not only as a response to the politics of 
neoliberalism but also as design activism’s production is exacerbated by 
neoliberalism’s crises (Julier, 2013b). He highlights four themes of such a design 
activism, as follows:  
 
intensification – which describes here a density of designerly intervention; 
co-articulation – which describes the marrying up of concerns or practices in 
a way that strengthens both; temporality – which describes the way that 
speed, slowness, or even open-endedness may be dealt with; 
territorialization – which describes the scale through which responsibility is 
conceived. (Julier, 2013b, p. 227) 
 
Julier’s themes here emphasise some interesting concepts, many of which resonate 
with some of my own work on philosophy, design and innovation (Brassett, 2014; 
2015; 2016), and others who draw upon some of the philosophers we will encounter 
below (see, for example: Grierson et al, 2015; O’Reilly, 2015; Marenko, 2015). While 
a more fulsome argument with these concepts will have to wait, I would like now to 
highlight Julier’s ‘temporality’ and ‘territorialisation’. His focus is obviously upon 
mapping ways in which design might practise as more resolutely activist, but the 
philosophically creative and pragmatic approach I will take here encounter similar 
concepts, and with similar urges. The creation of radical and oppositional 
temporalities will reappear below in terms of the speeds and slownesses of a thing’s 
constituent particles, the relations that are thus expressed and the values of the 




considerations of speed and slowness, giving the resultant complex a strongly 
ethical flavour (with the term ‘responsibility’). Taken together, all four of Julier’s 
themes chart a space and time for a creative intervention that accesses modes of 
action across social, political and ethical potentialities, that has as much to offer 
social innovation as it does design activism – as I hope to articulate in what follows. I 
would like to make one more connection from these concepts before moving on. 
 In ‘Control and Becoming’ (1995, p. 171) philosopher Gilles Deleuze reflects 
upon his and Félix Guattari’s characterisation of society in A Thousand Plateaus 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) thus: ‘society is defined not so much by its 
contradictions as by its lines of flight, it flees all over the place’. We will see particles 
of different speeds and slownesses appear in Spinoza’s account of bodies. With 
Deleuze on society here, these speeds and slownesses lead to highly dynamic 
social forms. Add to this Spinoza’s other angle on bodies – that they are 
characterised by their affective capacities – and we have the stuff of society as both 
dynamic and mutually impactful: for Deleuze and Spinoza this makes them ethical, 
or rather ethological. But this is an ethology that is deeply entangled with ontology: 
where the conditions for being are also those of relating, both of which are also 
expressions of creativity. It is time to move into the first section, and examine affect. 
 
2. The affects of designing innovating 
Writing of the ways in which matter is endowed with its own energy, its own 
vibrancy, and which it uses to form itself, political scientist Jane Bennett (2010, p. 
xii) aligns herself with a ‘Spinozist notion of affect, which refers broadly to the 




the concept of a socially responsiveness as good enough. She then quotes from 
Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (1988)4 but it is in Spinoza’s work that 
she recognises the concept of affect to be grounded. Similarly, Gregory Siegworth 
and Melissa Gregg, in the introductory essay to their collection The Affect Theory 
Reader (2010, p 3), describe as ‘one of the most oft-cited quotations concerning 
affect’, the following from Spinoza’s The Ethics (1996, p. 71): ‘No one has yet 
determined what the body can do’. There is much in this quotation – hence its 
characteristic as ‘oft-cited’ – but I will focus on the body in a sense that allows us to 
consider any designed thing (including images, garments, products, strategies and 
services) as a body.  
 In the larger of his books on Spinoza Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 
Deleuze writes (1990, p. 218): 
 
Spinoza can consider two fundamental questions as equivalent: what is the 
structure (fabrica) of a body? And: what can a body do? A body’s structure is 
the composition of its relations. What a body can do corresponds to the 
nature and limits of its capacity to be affected. (Original emphases)  
 
This highlights two points from Spinoza’s definition of the body that interest Deleuze 
so much – its relational composition and its action – and does so in ways that seem 
to chime with a traditional understanding of design: fabrica and function. This will 
                                            
4 ‘We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, 
how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, 
[. . .] to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, [. . .] to exchange actions and passions with it or to 
join with in composing a more powerful body’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p. 257). Quoted by 




soon be disrupted. In the Ethics Spinoza writes, ‘Bodies are distinguished from one 
another by reason of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and not by reason of 
substance’ (Spinoza, 1996, p. 41; IIL1); and later, ‘A body which moves or is at rest 
must be determined to motion or rest by another body, which has also been 
determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by another, and so on, to 
infinity’ (Spinoza, 1996, p. 41; IIL2). These will be the co-ordinates we will use in our 
encounter with Spinoza’s body.5 Deleuze explains this further (1988, p. 123), relating 
the first as kinetic (and second as dynamic, as we will see in a moment): 
 
Thus, the kinetic proposition tells us that a body is defined by relations of 
motion and rest, of slowness and speed between particles. That is, it is not 
defined by a form or by functions [. . .] One never commences; one never has 
a tabula rasa; one slips in, enters in the middle; one takes up or lays down 
rhythms. 
 
The body is not alone but multiple; made up of a multitude of particles that are 
accelerating, decelerating, constant, or at rest; with each of these particles making 
and breaking connections with other particles, other bodies. Without its elementary 
particles swerving and colliding, causing ricochets, accelerating and coming to a 
halt, without all of this a body is nothing. It is neither the aim of all this commotion, 
nor is it contained in these things undergoing different processes. The body is more 
than the sum of these particles, and exceeds the local organisation into organs that 
                                            
5 I examine these same co-ordinates in another article on philosophy and design, with focus on 




coalesce throughout the body. The body’s organisation is multiple, multiply 
differentiated and always excessive of any particular format it engenders for itself. It 
has moments where it tends to chaotic discord and catastrophe, and others of 
‘miserable’ territoriality (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984). As such the body, a body, 
bodies, are always in the middle6 of the fields of potential which they both situate 
and create. The structure of a body, then, is kinetic, relational and multiplicitous, and 
so crossed and folded-over with many other things, both organic and non-organic, 
that it is often difficult to see where one thing begins and another ends (Bennett, 
2010). Which brings us to the ‘dynamic’ proposition. Deleuze explains (1988, p. 
123): 
 
The second proposition concerning bodies refers us to the capacity for 
affecting or being affected. You will not define a body (or mind) by its form, 
nor by its organs or functions, and neither will you define it as a substance or 
a subject.  
 
The determination of the ‘affective capacity’ of a body comes from the disruption of 
its ordinary connections within social, scientific, natural, cultural (or whatever) 
schema and the allowing of many different properties to be re-connected in other, 
creative ways. It is dynamic because it is kinetic. If the body’s elements are multiple 
and moving at different rates, and these are colliding and ricocheting in different 
                                            
6 This ‘in the middle’ is key in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, not least in the concept of ‘becoming’ 
that we will spend more time on later in this article. Being in the middle relates, too, to the concept of 
milieu (the medium, middle and space) that philosopher and design theorist John O’Reilly (2015) 
writes well about regarding Deleuze, Canguilhem and illustration. See also: Deleuze and Guattari 




directions, then the forces that these swerves and collisions express are the 
affective capacities. If bodies are kinetically described – if we take account of the 
speeds and slownesses of the rhythms of their connections to other bodies and 
things – then they cannot help but affect other bodies. The possibilities that arise 
from being so kinetic and dynamic should surpass those thought of otherwise. 
Further, the sets of power that affective capacities announce mean that any set of 
relationships can be articulated differently, even if they are between the same things 
in the same space at different times, or the same things across different spaces at 
the same time, and so on. The urge to sameness of experience that notions like 
identity have – in their need to shore up all boundaries against the impact of 
turbulence, discussed so poetically by Michel Serres in his work on the 
philosophical, scientific poetry of the 1st Century BCE Roman Lucretius – dismiss 
the creative possibilities that the complex opening onto chaotic energies might have 
for any system, let alone those that are themselves already multiple (Serres, 2000; 
Brassett, 2013, 2015a; Brassett and O’Reilly, in press). 
 This journey through Spinoza’s body points to an utterly complex view of 
designing. If bodies are to be reconstructed according to the speeds and 
slownesses of their particles and the ways in which they affect each other, and not 
in relation to form, function and substance, then this should impact all bodies in 
space; especially designed ones, ones that have depended upon notions of form, 
function and material to ground both their own ontologies, and the power of those 
who benefit from such ontologies. And when this happens, when we realise that all 
designed things are multiplicitous conglomerations under different speeds and 




And when we think that designing can affect an innovative reconstitution of what the 
social might be, and so what and how our connections and relationships might allow, 
then such a conception of the body as Spinoza’s must make an impact here too; I 
will return to this later in this piece. 
 Design theorist Betti Marenko (2010, p. 136) notes a similar point, in a piece 
called ‘Contagious Affectivity – the management of emotions in late-Capitalist 
design’, writing that ‘all design has to do with intensities and affects circulating 
among the stakeholders: objects, designers, users, as well as contexts’ (original 
emphasis). With this we re-encounter the forces of design activism and reaction 
noted at the outset of this piece, realising that the ethical/ethological and ontological 
forces announced by the coming together of these discussions are also political and 
economic ones. For Marenko it is as important for us to remember that capitalism 
accesses and profits from the affective capacities of designer bodies, as the fact of 
design affectivity itself. A ‘positive’ affective perspective versus a ‘negative’ 
capitalist one is neither Marenko's argument nor that of the current essay. Rather, it 
is that when a social design is being created it might do better to move away from a 
reactive, resentful urge which nevertheless fails to challenge the hegemonies of 
capitalist machine, and engage instead in an active disruption of the very intensities 
and affective capacities upon which such a machine operates.7  
 Similar transpositions of creative philosophies of the many potentialities of 
being onto designing have already been undertaken, with particular focus on the 
                                            
7 Such a political discussion is somewhat outside the remit of this current paper. However, it would 
be worth consulting: Agamben (2009); Bennett (2010); Connolly (2011, 2013); who all engage many 





critique of hylomorphism.8 For example, Matthew Kearnes in an essay on design 
(2006), nanotechnology, chaos, control, Deleuze and philosopher of technics Gilbert 
Simondon, highlights how Simondon’s vehement attack on hylomorphism allows us 
to construct a new ontology of designing that focuses upon its (designing’s) 
participation in the processes of creation that matter and energy are already, always, 
undergoing. There must be another level of impact from this onto ethics, not least 
because for Spinoza and Deleuze any ontology will have ethical consequences. In 
fact, in the terms we have been using, any characterisation of bodies into speeds 
and slownesses of particles and the affective capacities that ensue will be both 
ethics and ontology. Which was Spinoza’s point. That when we (designers and 
innovators, as well as philosophers) partake in the construction of ontological 
opportunities – or, indeed, closing them down – this is an immensely ethical concern. 
We will take care to address how we do this, by dealing not only with the particular 
speeds and slownesses and affective capacities of things, but also the affects that 
these things experience, produce or block in the multitude of relations in which 
these designed things sit.  
 What have we collected so far on this philosophical journey through some 
moments of recent importance in ontology and ethics? Via Spinoza and Deleuze we 
find that bodies are networks of multiplicitous parts whose parts are speedy, slow or 
still, and that these parts and the wholes that emerge in their relations have affective 
                                            
8 Hylomorphism is the philosophical theory that posits that matter is inert and that it takes form only 
through the imposition of energy from an outside source, for example God, or a designer. See 
Aristotle’s De Anima (2012) for his account of hylomorphism in relation to his approach to psychology 
and mind-body problem. See Simondon’s work (1989, 2005, 2009) for its critique and the positing of 
a self-forming, energetic matter in terms of onto- and morphogenesis. Bennett (2010) takes this 
further in a book that engages the philosophies of Deleuze and especially Spinoza. For a discussion 
of hylomorphism and morphogenesis in relation to the same philosophers and design, see also: 




consequences. If we imagine bodies as agglomerations of particles under different 
speeds and slownesses, with different ways of affecting and being affected, and 
that these collections, these networks, can come together in many different ways, it 
would be good to examine a little the particular ways that this can occur. It is with 
this in mind that we move now to examine the concept of the assemblage. 
 
3. Assemblages/Agencements 
In the shorter of his books on Spinoza, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy Deleuze (1988, 
p. 23) writes that ethics is ‘a typology of immanent modes of existence’. With this 
way of imagining ethics come concepts of immanence and modes of existence, 
announced in terms of a word dear to design, ‘typology’. ‘Typology’ would appear 
an odd word for Deleuze to use, as it seems either to draw elements together in 
relation to common forms or features, or to homogenise via a totalisation of form. Its 
use in design might reinforce this, where typology can stand for an ideal form of 
something (in a Platonic sense), or a unified set of formal codes according to which 
things (products, images, services and so on) can be designed in order to be 
understood. Deleuze however is taking this concept of typology elsewhere, neither 
idealising nor homogenising, but becoming through continuous creative collision, 
connection and deviation – an activity also known as productive of assemblages. A 
concept that cuts across many of the works of Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 1986, 
1988; see also Guattari, 1984, 1989, 1995), it is worth focussing on ‘assemblage’ a 
little as it will play a part in what follows. I will do so first in relation to its use by 
Manuel De Landa in A New Philosophy of Society. Assemblage Theory and Social 




doing philosophy and sociology, while also recognising some other discussions 
(Philips, 2006; Venn, 2006), as this concept has taken flight and soared in recent 
years. I recognise that I will only be able to provide a snapshot of a much larger set 
of discourses on the concept of assemblage, but will do so in order to draw out 
important aspects for the current discussion. In effect, Spinoza’s view of bodies as 
kinetic and dynamic collections of relatively impactful particles has already brought 
us close to the concept of assemblage to be discussed. However, we will find 
nuances so far untouched. 
 For De Landa (2006) assemblage is closely aligned to his ontological 
approach to the social. That is, to the question ‘why does society exist in one way 
rather than another?’ he answers ‘because it is an assemblage’. His introduction of 
the concept of the assemblage is therefore ‘to elucidate the proper ontological 
status of the entities that are invoked by sociologists and other social scientists’ (De 
Landa, 2006, p. 8). In a way that ranks alongside a similar effort – Bruno Latour’s 
(2005) Reassembling the Social. An introduction to Actor-Network Theory – De 
Landa proposes to consider the conditions for the existence of the social as always 
already being constituted of things in networked relations with each other. De 
Landa’s account of assemblages, following the work of Deleuze and Guattari, is that 
they are ‘wholes characterized by relations of exteriority’ (De Landa, 2006, p. 10; 
original emphasis). Antagonistic both to totalities and essences, assemblages in De 
Landa’s account offer whole-part relationships that are emergent and ‘contingently 
obligatory’ (De Landa, 2006, p. 10) rather than logically necessary. For him, the most 
important aspect of an assemblage is that the ‘component parts enter into relations 




quoted above, the parts ‘flee all over the place.’ While De Landa’s assemblage as 
emergent whole of such relative components is resolutely nonreductionist (as he 
emphasises throughout), and though he argues against seeing assemblages as 
totalising, he does valorise the holistic final form that the assemblage takes – even if 
these are moments on the way to others, or crossing over others – as they retain ‘a 
relative autonomy’ at ‘each level of scale’ and ‘can therefore be a legitimate unit of 
analysis’ (De Landa, 2006, p. 119). What is missing from De Landa’s account – 
important as it is in any evaluation of the social or other organisational forms – is an 
investigation of the nature of the relations upon which they rely; that is, the opening 
up of assemblages to the relations of affect that situate both the component parts 
and the emergent wholes. We have encountered already an important conception of 
relationality in discussing affect: with Spinoza and Deleuze highlighting that bodies, 
and their composing parts, are ontologically valorised through their impacts upon 
each other. In one way, then, an assemblage is anything that emerges from the 
intensive relations upon which it is formed. But it is worth taking a moment to 
highlight another aspect of assemblage that is often overlooked in its current usage, 
escaping as it does from English translations of the work of Deleuze and Guattari; 
that is, the conceptual link to agency that is evident in their French term agencement.  
An exception to this is in the work of John Phillips’s wonderfully rich, short piece 
called ‘Agencement/Assemblage’ (2006).9 
 In this piece, Phillips teases out both the overlaps and discrepancies in 
meaning between the French and the English concepts. Highlighting agencement’s 
                                            
9 See also the introductory chapter to Eric Alliez and Andrew Goffey’s collection The Guattari Effect 




relations to other of Deleuze’s concepts – sense, event and becoming – he notes 
especially the underlying notion of ‘in connection with’ that is accentuated more in 
the French than the English translation.10 Where the English term’s tendency is to 
give prominence to the concrete ‘state of affairs’ of any collection – as with De 
Landa – the French has a greater fluidity in its focus upon the relations of connection 
between the parts that are now collected. Phillips (2006, p. 108) writes: 
‘Agencement designates the priority of neither the state of affairs nor the statement 
but of their connection, which implies the production of a sense that exceeds them 
and of which, transformed, they now form parts’. More everyday French usage 
pitches agencement into distinctly design and innovation territories, with 
connotations of layout, planning or arrangement. Michel Callon – one of the 
originators of Actor Network Theory – makes a similar point in an essay (2006) on 
performativity and economics. He writes: 
 
The term agencement is a French word that has no exact English 
counterpart. In French its meaning is very close to ‘arrangement’ (or 
‘assemblage’). It conveys the idea of a combination of heterogeneous 
elements that have been carefully adjusted one another. But arrangements 
(as well as assemblages) could imply a sort of divide between human agents 
(those who arrange or assemble) and things that have been arranged. This is 
why Deleuze and Guattari (1998) proposed the notion of agencement. 
Agencement has the same root as agency: agencements are arrangements 
                                            
10 Though it is worth noting that Guattari uses agencement in the senses discussed here before 





endowed with the capacity of acting in different ways depending on their 
configuration. This means that there is nothing left outside agencements: 
there is no need for further explanation, because the construction of its 
meaning is part of an agencement. A socio-technical agencement includes 
the statement[s] pointing to it, and it is because the former includes the latter 
that the agencement acts in line with the statement, just as the operating 
instructions are part of the device and participate in making it work. (Callon, 
2006, p. 13)  
 
Here Callon brings us back to the important, but somewhat overlooked, role agency 
has in agencement/assemblage. Agency is thus founded upon an ability to arrange, 
to act, to design and innovate, to make connections between things in creative ways 
whose affective potentials then exceed the possibilities of the designer or innovator, 
and which excesses then are folded back into and enrich further opportunities for 
impactful creative production. In the ‘Introduction’ to Deleuze and Design (Brassett 
and Marenko, 2015, pp. 5–6), the authors note Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the 
reflexive verb ‘se dessiner’ in describing Kafka’s work. ‘Two problems enthral Kafka,’ 
Deleuze and Guattari write, ‘when can one say that a statement is new? [. . .] and 
when can one say that a new assemblage is coming into view?’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1986, p. 83; original emphasis). ‘Coming into view’ is the translators’ 
choice to render ‘se dessine’,11 which can also be translated as ‘emerges’, and 
more literally ‘designs itself’. The argument that I have been setting up here is one in 
                                            
11 This whole ‘second problem’ is as follows in the original: ‘quand peut-on dire qu’un nouvel 




which the social, ethical and ontological considerations of life, of a life thought 
individually and collectively, design themselves. Assemblages, agencements emerge, 
stand out, come into view not passively, but actively. This is not only what design 
does, but also what it is: it is constituted by its actions of emergent assemblage 
production. Therefore, the focus of any design upon the ontological – upon the 
creation of modes of existence, as I will discuss next – is also an engagement with 
the socio-ethical; and, even, the political. Design designs our ontological 
possibilities, distributing them across fields of potential in affective relationships. 
The emerging ethics constitutes both a social design and a political design, and 
those of us interested in using such philosophical and designerly concepts in driving 
social innovation should take heed. This is why Kafka, as told by Deleuze and 
Guattari, was interested in how a new agencement se dessine: in how the capacities 
for action so key to any form of agency are given the ability to emerge, to self-
arrange, to design themselves. For Kafka, of course, such agency is often 
exemplified in its absence, removal, or blockage. It serves those of us involved in 
designing and innovating (in all cases, not just socially focused), then, to consider 
how it is it that our work encourages the emergence and creative self-proliferation of 
ontological, social, ethical and political agencements. To ensure, as I will argue next, 
that our designing-innovating creates potential and pluralities of modes of existence, 
the milieus in which they proliferate, the connections that take them constantly out 
of themselves, and the assemblages of agency that emerge. 
 It serves us now turn to modes of existence understood particularly in 
relation to the work of one philosopher, Étienne Souriau, in order to argue that an 




production of agencements, will be concerned with the creation of modes of 
existence. 
 
4. Modes of Existence 
Étienne Souriau (1892–1979) was a philosopher renowned for his work on aesthetics, 
holding a chair in this at the Sorbonne, Paris and serving as editor of the Revue 
d’esthétique. The work I will be focusing upon in this section is Les différents modes 
d’existence12 originally published in 1943 and recently republished (2009) with an 
extensive preface by philosophers of science Isabelle Stengers and Bruno Latour. 
But why turn to this work – the work of a mostly forgotten philosopher? Quite simply, 
because the ontological demand that reconsidering being in terms of the more 
multiplicitous ‘modes of existence’ offers much, albeit as a rather ‘abyssal thought’ 
(as Nietzsche described his thinking of the eternal return in Thus Spoke Zarathustra): 
a thought with deep and serious consequences for metaphysics and epistemology 
as well as ontology. Consequences also for designing and innovating especially, as I 
hope to show here. 
 Souriau describes his ontology thus: 
 
It is a matter of inventing (as one ‘invents’ a treasure), of discovering positive 
modes of existence, coming to meet us with their palm fronds, to greet our 
hopes, our aspirations, or our problematic speculations, in order to gather 
them in and comfort them. All other research is metaphysical famine. 
(Souriau, 2009, pp. 142–3) 
                                            





The greeting, welcoming, opening towards that describes an act of creating 
instaurates not only the work but also our modes of existence. This instauration – 
inception, establishment – is an important concept for Souriau as it takes the 
creative act away from being the imposition of form onto inert matter by an 
energetic genius, so beloved of any designer. To work as an artist, or a philosopher, 
or even a designer without engaging in such instauration is, he emphasises, 
‘metaphysical famine’. An important issue here is the immanence of the thing 
created and the creator. The very act of creation opens up opportunities – 
ontological opportunities especially – for the whole creating/created milieu. And just 
as many things can be instaurated, so can such an act bring forth, welcome, myriad 
modes of existence. Stengers and Latour – in their prefatory essay to Souriau’s 
book – add their own exposition in terms that are heavily reliant upon the examples 
of creative practice that are so important to Souriau: ‘To say of a work of art that it is 
“instaurated”, is to prepare oneself to make of the potter one who welcomes, 
collects, prepares, explores and invents – as one invents a treasure – the form of the 
work’ (Stengers and Latour, 2009, pp. 10–11). Being instaurated, a work of creativity 
emerges from an entanglement of different forces – some channelled through the 
human, others from a multitude of other directions – and allows for the variety of 
beings that coalesce along the way their own inception.13 Piece by piece, moment 
by moment, collision by collision, creative works are discovered and invented by 
                                            
13 In Genesis (1995, p. 57) Michel Serres explains: ‘instauration is a Greek word meaning fork, 
meaning bifurcation, which sketches a cross or a dovetail. In the beginning is the crossroads’. The 
emphasis here is on the break, or change of direction, of a flow. For a questioning note about 




those for whom their very beings are in reciprocal processes of discovery and 
invention (Souriau, 2009, p. 108–9).  
 For Souriau, to focus upon modes of existence is to recognise that being is 
multiplicitous, dynamic, changing and creative, more than single, simple and 
identifiable, and always yet to come.14 Such modes are already affective speedy, 
slow and still agencements. In an essay on the ways in which Souriau’s concept of 
instauration and Simondon’s approach to individuation collide, Alice Haumont 
explains that both philosophers ‘build a thought that embraces modes of existence, 
between which human life is woven’ (Haumont, 2002, p. 70; original emphasis; my 
translation). Human life is not situated in any special being human, but erupts in 
between the creations in which it is implicated and explicated, across many different 
modes. She writes further: ‘[the human] can become human only on the condition of 
opening itself up to these ways of being that surpass it on all sides’ (Haumont, 2002, 
p. 70; original emphasis; my translation).15 The human is the basis for its possible 
modes of existence (‘these ways of being’), without being their cause, and if it is 
‘opened up’ to them can find many new ways of being; that is, it can engage in an 
active and creative becoming. Haumont’s human is opening up into its very own 
crevices, and finding that its own interstitial moments offer opportunities for 
                                            
14 Alfred North Whitehead (whom Souriau references positively throughout the work under 
discussion) shares an approach to being that prioritises its process of becoming rather than its 
transcendent unity: ‘how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is; so that the 
two descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its “being” is constituted by its “becoming”. 
This is the “principle of process”’ (Whitehead, 1978, p. 23; original emphases). See also Connolly 
(2011). It is important, also, to note here an important concept in Souriau’s text, one that Stengers 
and Latour focus upon heavily: that of the ‘work to come’. I will leave a full examination of this to 
another time, suffice to say that existence considered as a ‘work to come’ will be oriented externally 
(as De Landa says of assemblages), developing new relations and opportunities for affecting and 
being affected, forever proliferating its different modes of being as becoming. 
15 I engage with issues of modes of existence, design and ethology in relation to Simondon in a 




ontological development. But for her, as she follows Simondon and Souriau, the 
human is not a unifying or totalising factor bringing all these things under control, 
but the name of a particular set of material tendencies that assemble and affect and 
launch in directions of which these very tendencies are unaware. 
 It is with Latour’s reading (2011, 2013) that many of the design-related issues 
emerge, though this is not necessarily a novel evaluation of Souriau’s work 
interested as Souriau was in aesthetics.16 Both regard the bringing into being of a 
work of art, or science (or, we might add, a work of design) as an act of devotion, an 
act of instauration that encourages the work on its trajectory of becoming at the 
same time as it provides the material upon which an artist’s, scientist’s, designer’s, 
and so on, modes of being are conceived. Souriau explains: 
 
But one can also exist by the force of others. There are certain things – 
poems, symphonies or homelands – that do not possess access to existence 
by themselves. Man has to devote himself to their being; and perhaps in this 
devotion he might, incidentally, find a real existence. In any case, this act of 
existence designates and takes note of this success (of being or its support) 
insofar as it is achieved. (Souriau, 2009, p. 110) 
 
There are things whose participation in existence is mediated and modulated 
through human creative action, Souriau explains here. At the same time this action 
                                            
16 It is worth remembering the affective nature of the original Greek for this term, aisthetikos, which 
relates to sensation. Souriau gathers this in a marvellous line about things: ‘Sensations are in a way 
the roar of phenomena’ (Souriau, 2009, p. 117). For a fuller discussion of the affective import of 
design’s aisthetikos swerved through the question of the role of style in designing and innovating the 




allows for human existential journeys to flow, indeed these are engendered by what 
had seemed like a one-way creative inception. The success of Souriau’s instauration 
is evident not only in multiplicitous existences that it produces, but as multiplicitous 
too. The thoroughly intertwined ontological generation of creator and created in any 
act of creation shifts existential locus from any one mode of being across a whole 
field of possibility. Just as Spinoza distributes of ethical import across a network of 
variously intensive and related elements, so here Souriau undoes any reliance upon 
actual or transcendent unity of being, favouring instead a collection of modes in 
ever-churning dynamism. To design things, then, is that process in which the 
designer devotes herself to the possibilities of her own being; and the things, the 
multi-modal opportunities that are instaurated in any act of creation, open-up at 
least as many directions for her being to become. This is further intensified as the 
existential modalities offered to those who encounter this work are themselves 
opened up to new possibilities (or closed down into a straight-jacketed single mode 
of being in ways that Deleuze and Guattari (1984) term ‘miserable totalities’).  
 The ‘roar’ of phenomena giving rise to sensations (Souriau, 2009, p. 113) is 
an affect of the multimodal bringing into being undertaken not only by individual 
creatives but by the multiple and complex web of relations in which their existence 
is entailed. Humans’ modes of existence and the works that they produce are in 
relationships that are either reciprocally supportive or damaging. ‘Each mode [of 
existence] alone’, Souriau (2009, p. 111) writes, ‘is itself an art of existence’. It 
seems irrelevant whether the modes of existence that emerge from the relations 
between humans, matter, technologies, things, and so on, belong to any one of 




intertwined are they in each other’s existences. And to draw each one, any one, of 
them out is an art, a skill, a fiction, a fabulation, a design. I will return later to the 
consequences this has for a designed social innovation, but say briefly that this 
offers an ontological account for designing that must address the emergent 
possibilities that occur at different orders of magnitude throughout the variety of 
assemblages that any affective relationality must develop. Any acts of designing will 
simultaneously allow for, or deny, a range of ontological opportunities at levels that 
go from the micro-modal to the macro-social. One does not simply design social 
systems of smartphones, but ways of being and becoming whose inter-affects will 
allow better or worse relations between human-human, human-thing, thing-social, 
human-thing-social, and so on. 
 Design theorist Betti Marenko (2015) highlights the morphogenic qualities of 
the modern smartphone in her essay titled ‘Digital Materiality, Morphogenesis and 
the Intelligence of the Technodigital Object’. No longer a simple object the 
smartphone, Marenko posits, becomes whatever ‘app, programme, stream of data’ 
it runs at any moment, converging a ‘highly immersive, sensory and somatic 
experience’ becoming ‘a new assemblage of multiple material intelligences, not 
necessarily and not exclusively human’ (Marenko, 2015, p. 107). For Marenko the 
liquidity of ontological positions adoptable by such a technological ‘device’ puts into 
question those of the ‘humans’ supposedly ‘using’ them. As the materialising and 
dematerialising nature of the phone remodulates its own existential opportunities in 
relation to the particular contingencies according to which its software and 
hardware interact (with, it should be said the various assemblages of power, 




Marenko offers, so it also does for ‘us’. Such a platform – all hardware (Kittler 1992; 
see also Marenko, 2015; Hales, 2015 and 2016) – is a plane of possible existences 
modulating and remodulating: instaurating. 
 Souriau’s position gives us another perspective on relations between 
designers and things than those that privilege the designer as the godlike giver of 
form to inert matter. We have encountered an ontology of designed things that 
locates not in simple isolation according to form, function and substance, but as 
affective assemblages/agencements, which move at different rates. They (designers) 
are involved in processes of instauration developing multiple modes of existence 
that should also be seen as producing them. Latour emphasises that ‘each [mode of 
existence] should be granted the capacity to produce, in its own way, the 
assemblage of ontological categories that are its very own’ (Latour, 2011, p. 316). 
With things and bodies becoming assemblages – along with artists and designers, 
scientists and the rest of us too, pitching into worlds of assemblages of modes of 
existence each with their own vectors of production impacting creatively on 
everything else, and so on . . . – it seems Spinoza’s characterisation of complex 
networks of kinetic and dynamic constructs is the most coherent. Designers, 
innovators, all of those who create, things and bodies, and all, all are multimodal, 
multi-affective assemblages, speeding up, decelerating and grinding to a halt in ever 
more complex concoctions.  
 Latour brings us back to the ethics of all this, writing (2011, p. 329) that the 
‘only worthwhile question (in theology as much as in art and science) concerns what 
it is good to fabricate’ (original emphasis ). This might be the only worthwhile 




instaurate, to allow to emerge from the many different forces, materials and relations 
that gather together at any one moment, under specific conditions? What, also, are 
the many modes of existence that are enabled and disabled, connected and 
blocked through such an instauration? An ethological account of this ‘good’ is one 
that maps and measures the affective impacts of the relationships of the many 
modes of existence brought into the open by designing and innovating. These 
modes are the collective agencements/assemblages fabricated as the networked 
particles of Spinoza’s bodies. As we have seen they – modes and particles – are 
many, dynamic, and can dissipate as soon as they form. I would add – to Latour’s 
and Souriau’s takes on modes of existence – that these modes can scale up to 
various sizes of collective depending upon the relative perspective one is taking. 
Modes of existence can take shape as social networks and cultural forms, fashion 
tendencies and political actions, and so many other things, each with its own 
speeds and slownesses, affective capacities and character as assemblage. 
 
5. Towards an ethological design-driven innovation  
At the opening of a book containing a collection of lectures given in the mid-/late-
1930s after his retirement, philosopher and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead 
writes the following: ‘[philosophy’s] primary stage can be termed assemblage’ (1966, 
p. 2; original emphasis). It is a small reference, but beckons much. Ranged against 
‘systematisation’ – a totalising and closed grouping of ideas – Whitehead values 
‘assemblage’ as an open-ended gathering together of matters-of-fact and matters-
of-importance. Which recalls Latour’s discussion of design in his Keynote address at 




10), wherein he describes design as moving beyond dealing in ‘matters of fact’ and 
more with ‘matters of concern17’. For Latour designing is that which constructs 
assemblages of affective importance from interconnected things in the production of 
‘matters of concern’. These assemblages move us away from mythologies or 
ideologies of totalisation through mastery, towards those that value openness, 
connection and dynamic evolution. Latour highlights this through his use of the word 
‘thing’: from an Old English (from Old Norse) word that captured not only the 
discussion of matters of concern, but the spaces in which these took place. The 
creative production of a thing, anything designed, innovated (and all), is the 
assembling of a number of different concerns at a moment in time, as well as the 
assembling in an immanent fashion of the conditions for such an assemblage to 
take place. This recalls Deleuze’s depiction of ethics (1988, p. 23; quoted above) as 
the ‘typology of immanent modes of existence’. These creative conditions 
generating novel modes of existence are not only ontological and spatial – and so 
personal, social and political – but ethological too.  
 We have seen above how Spinoza’s concept of affect helps reconstitute 
bodies in space as things with a multitude of sensational and emotional impacts. 
That terms such as ‘subject’ and ‘object’ have been avoided is telling. Subjects and 
objects, such as they are, are the outcomes of the many interconnected things and 
the opening up, or closing down, of possibilities that ensues, not the primary 
grounds of the production of anything. What this essay’s journey through affect, 
                                            
17 Whitehead (1966, p. 167) mentions ‘concern’ – ‘in the Quaker sense of that term’ – towards the 
end of Modes of Thought. This Quaker term is interesting as it is ‘an imperative to action’, a divinely 
inspired ‘obligatory call to action’ (Hall, 2013), which is partly encompassed in Latour’s use here. I 
would also note that along with desire, interest and worry, a ‘going concern’ characterises a business 




assemblage and modes of existence offers is: 1) that things are connected and 
influential across those connections; 2) that different assemblages can emerge from 
these connections; and 3) that these affective assemblages can provide the stuff 
from which modes of existence can be produced, and can be generated by such 
modes too. In all of these cases designing and innovating play a key role. This is 
highlighted by Stengers in her ‘free and wild’ conceptual ‘adventure’ with the work 
of Whitehead, where she writes: 
 
Far from constituting a ‘defining characteristic’, my feeling of being ‘me’, 
continuously, in a heterogeneous world in which my attention never ceases 
to vary, which the mutations of my interests, the permanent transformations 
of the ‘here’ of my perception, never cease to recompose, is thus in itself an 
‘exploit’ requiring that the ‘chains of reiteration of the past’ be constantly 
forged, tinkered with, and improvised. (Stengers, 2011, pp. 325–6) 
 
For Stengers here the act of making us us, of giving us a sense of continuity in flux, 
over changing, heterogeneous times and spaces, is an act of innovation: life is an 
exploit of transformation, recomposition, variance and mutation, ‘constantly forged, 
tinkered with, and improvised.’ We are in a constant process of being designed. This 
is also an activity of never-ending, production and agencement/assemblage-making 
of inter-affecting modes of existence. As such, when the affective capacities of 
these creative assemblages of modes of existence are accounted for, then these 
acts become innovation characterised as both social and ethical. An innovation that 




engage these ontological and ethical consideration. Which is one of the points of 
this piece and need unpacking a little further.  
 Once designing-innovating – again all, not simply that which articulates itself 
as social – recognises its character as affective, assembling and allowing for many 
modes of existence across a multiplicity of planes, then it should realise that these 
ontologies operate at different scales throughout such multiplicitous planes. This 
approach is not privileging one type of existence over another. Collections of things, 
people, societies, powers and processes are still affective and assembled, modal 
and existential; and ethical. A social innovation driven by design, then, is one that 
maps and mobilises such affective assemblages of modes of existence, deliberately 
and actively. It is one that recognises it is deploying ethological and ontological 
powers, and that by so doing it reinforces or disavows the various agential 
possibilities of the modes, and clusters of modes, of existence that emerge. This is 
not a reactive choice, but an important, active and at the same time deeply 
committed one, which should have ramifications for all types of creative practice. 
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